Ignoring the obvious : the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry\u27s failure to monitor public health on the Clark Fork River Superfund sites by Tuholske, Lilly
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1993 
Ignoring the obvious : the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry's failure to monitor public health on the Clark 
Fork River Superfund sites 
Lilly Tuholske 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Tuholske, Lilly, "Ignoring the obvious : the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry's failure to 
monitor public health on the Clark Fork River Superfund sites" (1993). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8990. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8990 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
Copying allowed as provided under provisions 
of the Fair Use Section of the U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW, 1976.
Any copying for commercial purposes 
or financial gain may be undertaken only 
with the author’s written consent.
University ofMontana
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IGNORING THE OBVIOUS:
THE AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY'S 




B. S. University of Wisconsin— Madison, 1979
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Master of Arts in Journalism 




Chairman, Board of Examiners
Ml. .J  ---  ■ ■ ■ I ~Dean, Graduate School
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39791
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,




Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProjQupst
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Tuholske/ Lilly, Master of Arts, June 1993 Journalism
Ignoring the Obvious: The Agency For Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry's Failure to Monitor Public Health on the 
Clark Fork River Superfund Sites (50 PAGES)
Director: Joe Durso, Jr.
Montana holds the nation's largest hazardous waste site: 
a 120-mile stretch of the Clark Fork River that passes over 
land contaminated with arsenic, lead, copper, mercury, 
cadmium and pentachlorophenol - a century's worth of mining 
wastes. In 1983, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
designated this land as four separate but contiguous federal 
Superfund sites on its National Priorities List, thus making 
the region eligible for cleanup. Since attaining National 
Priorities List status, relatively little cleanup has been 
completed.
This study documents the government's performance on these 
Superfund sites, particularly the failings of the Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, an agency established 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (the 1980 Superfund Law). The agency is 
to monitor public health on federal Superfund sites, thereby 
helping the EPA determine which areas are most dangerous. 
However, since the agency was created in 1983, it has 
suffered from inadequate funding, poor leadership and 
misunderstanding, especially among EPA personnel who work on 
Superfund projects.
More than 40,000 people live on the Clark Fork River 
Superfund sites. Records from Montana's Office of Public 
Instruction and Vital Records and Statistics Bureau reveal 
that the population residing on these sites has experienced 
high rates of disease and mortality as a whole, along with 
high rates of learning disorders in children. Despite its 
claims to the contrary, to date, the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry has not completed health 
assessments required by law on the four sites, nor conducted 
a comprehensive health study of the region. The result of 
this failing is that people living on the Clark Fork sites 
have not been adequately informed about possible health 
risks associated with the region's contaminants.
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Chapter One: Dominion of Poison
On the crest of the east ridge above Butte, Montana, 
stands Our Lady of the Rockies, a 90-foot white statue, a 
modern version of Mary, the mother of Christ. Our Lady is 
visible for miles as she presides with hands outstretched, 
not over a spectacular mountain panorama, but over the 
nation's largest toxic dumping ground. Here lies 100 years 
of mining wastes along Montana's Clark Fork River.
The statue's dominion begins over a murky little stream 
in the Clark Fork's headwaters. Silver Bow Creek runs out 
of the mountains and through the steeply sloped town of 
Butte. For decades, no fish have lived in Silver Bow Creek, 
nor for that matter, have insects nor many of the various 
microbes one would expect to find in a mountain stream.
Life abandoned the creek when it became a waste dump to 
carry away mixtures of lead, arsenic, mercury, copper and 
zinc from Butte's mines.
Butte has lived and died for mining. During the last 
century some $22 billion worth of gold, silver and copper 
have been raked from beneath its mountains, with the bulk of 
the profits going to the Anaconda Mining Company. Beginning 
in the 1870s, Butte's mining empires dominated Montana 
politics, filled the state's coffers and colored the
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region's history until the mid-1970s, when large-scale 
mining was phased out.
Remaining under the city are thousands of miles of 
abandoned mine shafts. But it is above ground where the 
remnants of mining are most dramatic: a scoured landscape, 
nowhere near resembling the graceful collection of mountains 
it once was. The most obvious relic is the Berkeley Pit. 
More than a mile across and one half-mile deep, the pit is a 
gigantic hole in the ground, a void where a mountain once 
stood. Formerly the largest truck-operated copper mine in 
the world, the Berkeley Pit is now the deepest and the most 
polluted body of water in Montana.
If Our Lady could actually see, on a clear day her gaze 
would pass over a massive smoke stack that stands some 30 
miles downstream. The Washoe Stack looms 585 feet from its 
base atop a densely black mountain of slag interspersed with 
piles of blue, white and brown arsenic-rich flue dust and 
tailings leftover from the Anaconda Mining Company's Washoe 
Smelter.
If you stand on the slag mountain at the base of the 
Washoe Stack and look out, the vision below is not of 
Anaconda homes and businesses but of a moonscape of barren 
soil where nothing grows at all. Spilling out to the 
northeast are the Anaconda and Opportunity ponds, thousands 
of acres of brown, orange and white settling grounds holding 
upwards of 3 million cubic yards of smelting wastes.
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From just outside Anaconda, the Clark Fork River flows 
northwest across farms and ranches. Along its banks are 
barren crusty white patches of earth - what the locals call 
slickens - where mining sediments have accumulated. The 
river meanders for 120 miles until it is dammed just outside 
of Milltown, Montana. There, what used to be a reservoir 
behind the dam is now more like a swamp, choked with deadly 
sediments that weren't captured in any of the settling ponds 
upstream.
In 1977, the Atlantic Richfield Company purchased the 
Anaconda Mining Company, holdings that included the Berkeley 
Pit and the Anaconda Smelter. Five years later two things 
happened; Butte's mines were shut down and the region's 
environmental problems were discovered.
A local health department worker running routine tests 
on residential well water found arsenic in the drinking 
water of several Milltown homes. The source of the arsenic 
was leachate from the Milltown dam reservoir that had worked 
its way into the groundwater. The arsenic discovery 
prompted the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to 
designate all the land from Butte to Milltown to its 
National Priorities List as four separate but adjacent sites 
eligible to be cleaned up with federal Superfund monies. 
Together, the four units comprise the nation's largest 
Superfund project.
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The EPA found that the contaminants in the area varied 
considerably. In Butte, entire neighborhoods were built 
atop waste rock from the mines. Soils, some oozing 
elemental mercury, held upwards of 3,000 parts per million 
lead. In Anaconda, arsenic that for 80 years had spewed 
from the Washoe Stack permeated ranch land and residential 
yards and gardens alike. Downstream, copper spoiled the 
Clark Fork when summer thunder storms occasionally washed 
soil from the slickens into the river, killing thousands of 
fish. Throughout all, cadmium contaminated soil and 
threatened groundwater. And on one 40-acre tract where mine 
timbers and railroad ties had been treated, 
pentachlorophenol, a carcinogen, percolated through the 
ground and into Silver Bow Creek.
Thus lay the dirty little secret of beautiful Montana, 
which so recently has earned national attention as the 
nation's "last best place." None of the literature urging 
tourists to visit the region's historic mining district 
mentions that the area is still managed under the Superfund 
program. No sign tells unwary out-of-towners they'll be 
venturing into a hazardous waste zone simply by driving into 
uptown Butte or stopping to fish along the upper reaches of 
the Clark Fork. Only quietly is it mentioned that together, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Atlantic 
Richfield Company have spent upwards of $54 million over the
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past 10 years trying to figure out how to rid the region of 
its toxic wastes.
Protecting public health never was taken seriously by 
the mining barons nor their thousands of employees during 
the years when the mines held the promise of Montana's 
future. Nor is public health a predominant issue today, not 
for the residents, not for the politicians, not for the EPA. 
What's perhaps more surprising is that 10 years after the 
area was designated for cleanup under the Superfund program, 
public health receives only token acknowledgement by the 
agency created by Congress to monitor and protect health on 
federal Superfund sites, the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry. To date, that agency has not undertaken 
any comprehensive health study of the region, nor has it 
fulfilled its own requirements for conducting health 
assessments on the four Superfund sites.
Never mind that scientists have long recognized that 
mining communities nationwide are plagued with health 
problems. In this regard, Butte and Anaconda, with 
populations of nearly 34,000 and 10,000 respectively, are no 
different. In 1991, two researchers studying impacts from 
large-scale mining found high rates of mortality and disease 
in Butte and Anaconda. This high rate of death may in part 
be attributed to occupational hazards incurred by the men 
who worked in the mines or at the smelter. But what cannot 
be so easily accounted for are the high rates of certain
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types of cancer among women whose only connection with 
mining was that they lived in the area.
Various entities have conducted some medical tests.
For example, the Atlantic Richfield Company, which may 
ultimately be required to pay for cleanup, has financed a 
University of Cincinnati study of blood lead in Butte's 
children. The Centers for Disease Control conducted urinary 
arsenic tests in Anaconda. And the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry did study arsenic and lead 
exposure among residents of Rocker, a small community 
outside of Butte.
These specific studies, however, failed to address what 
local residents allude to in terms entirely unscientific.
"It seems like every family gathering I go to... everybody 
talks about so and so's cancer," said Mary Lou Sullivan, who 
was born in Butte and raised in Anaconda. Such talk is 
typical. Cancer is rampant in Butte. Anyone who knows 
anything about Butte knows that.
A faith-filled individual might believe that Our Lady 
of the Rockies protects her people. One might also imagine 
that Our Lady grasps the connection between hundreds of 
square miles of mine wastes and the health of those who live 
here. Certainly, no other entity, not the local health 
department, nor the state Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences, nor the EPA, nor the Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is any more likely a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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source of information about public health than is Our Lady 
of the Rockies herself. All are equally mute.
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Chapter Two: A Toxic Revelation
On a late-November night in Washington, D.C. in 1980, 
Curtis Moore hatched an idea that he hoped would begin to 
solve the mysteries behind toxic wastes and public health. 
During the previous decade, Moore had served as counsel on 
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
coordinating hearings on the health effects of exposure to 
toxic chemicals. These hearings were precursors to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, better known as the Superfund law. Now, on 
the eve of Superfund's passage, Moore was up late, 
struggling to find a way to put back the measures to protect 
public health that had been gutted from the original bill.
Oddly, Moore's involvement in Superfund had begun not 
from the government's concern over hazardous wastes, but 
rather when the oil industry complained to Congress because 
several states that had fallen victim to massive oil spills 
during the 1960s had enacted laws imposing taxes and 
liability on oil companies for cleanup. Oil industry 
executives balked at the mishmash of laws that arose and 
petitioned Congress to enact one blanket federal law that 
would preempt the various state laws. The federal law would 
establish a "superfund" that would pay for the cleanup of 
oil spills wherever they occurred.
8
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While politicians and industry representatives wrangled 
over specifics of the Superfund proposal through the early 
70s, the issue of toxic chemical spills and their subsequent 
effect on humans crept into the argument like an uninvited 
guest. Throughout the United States, reports of never- 
before-heard-of chemicals leaching into groundwater, oozing 
out of abandoned dumps and seeping into basements frequently 
filled the pages of national newspapers and magazines. Thus 
began the national revelation: chemical wastes could be
dangerous.
The Environmental Protection Agency identified some
6,000 hazardous waste sites nationwide and reported that at 
least 90 percent of hazardous wastes threatened the 
environment because of improper disposal. Twenty-seven of 
the 6,000 sites were positively linked to health problems - 
kidney damage, cancer, mutations, aborted pregnancies, to 
name a few.
Testifying at one hearing. Dr. David Rail, then 
director of the National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences, declared that the entire population of the United 
States was at risk from exposure to toxic chemicals. The 
Department of Health and Human Services concluded that "the 
scope of the health problems that could derive from chemical 
waste dumps...could be enormous."
Congress responded with a flurry of bills that in the 
aggregate proposed that the government create an emergency
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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response system to deal with the release of hazardous 
substances, that those responsible for the releases be 
liable for any cleanup costs and that victims injured or 
made ill be compensated. None of the bills passed, however, 
before the tale of Love Canal came to the fore.
When Love Canal homeowners began complaining of various 
health problems, in particular birth defects in their 
children that included double rows of teeth, cleft palate, 
enlarged heart, vision and hearing impairment and 
retardation, their concerns initially fell on deaf ears. 
Finally, studies revealed what Congress later called 
"startling" health problems: Unusually high incidents of
attempted suicide, nervous breakdowns, hyperactivity in 
children, epilepsy, asthma and urinary tract infections.
Nine of sixteen children born in one area had birth defects, 
a rate of 56 percent.
By the late 1970s, Moore knew well the tales of people 
being poisoned by toxic chemicals. He had gathered 
thousands of pages of testimony at hearings held in 
Washington, D.C., Niagara Falls, New York, Charles City, 
Iowa, and San Francisco, California. He had spent countless 
hours massaging the oil industry'^s Superfund bill into 
legislation that would cover the release of a myriad of 
toxic substances into the environment. (Ironically, oil was 
not one of them.) And he drafted the public health and
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victim compensation portions of SB 1480, the 1980 Superfund 
law.
The Superfund law provided the EPA with the authority 
to determine the extent of hazardous waste contamination 
nationwide and enforce cleanup that would be paid for by the 
industries responsible. Sites would be ranked on the 
National Priorities List according to their relative risk. 
The EPA would be responsible for researching each site and 
orchestrating cleanup.
Said Moore in a recent interview, concern for the 
health of those who were exposed to toxic substances was the 
"driver” for Superfund.
"We concluded that there were a lot of people out there 
who were being injured by toxic chemicals - but probably in 
very subtle and insidious ways in which the legal system was 
ill-equipped to deal with," Moore said.
In writing Superfund, Moore wanted to provide 
legislation that would allow victims of toxic spills to be 
compensated.
"After all, the victim's only relationship to these 
incidents ordinarily is he's the poor sucker who got hit by 
the train," Moore said. "He's an innocent bystander."
The proposed legislation provided that polluters would 
not only be liable for the cost of cleanup but also to pay 
for damages incurred by any victims - damages to health or 
the pocketbook.
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But by mid-year in 1980, after the Superfund bill had 
worked its way through the Congressional labyrinth, the 
politics in Washington were due to change considerably. 
Reagan was on the verge of defeating Carter, Congress would 
hold a lame duck session and industry representatives - who 
by now were adamantly opposed to Superfund - were feeling 
bold. Such boldness translated into a number of political 
maneuvers that succeeded in keeping the Superfund bill from 
being brought before the Senate until Congress was ready to 
adjourn. Though SB 1480 was released from committee on July 
11, 1980, it didn't make it to the Senate floor for
consideration until November.
"We were at the point where we had to start carving 
chunks of it off in order to get it considered by the full 
Senate," Moore said. "And finally it's obvious that we have 
to let go of victim's compensation as well," he said. 
"...It's the price we are going to have to pay [to get the 
bill considered by the full Senate.]"
Such a compromise did not rest lightly with Moore:
"At one o'clock in the morning. I'm sitting in my 
basement, trying to figure out what to do to take care of 
victims. And I become convinced that one of things we lack 
is adequate information on the health effects of toxic 
chemicals."
"Every place you go, it doesn't make any difference 
whether you go to Love Canal or Charles City or anyplace
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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else, if you look into PBB's or PCB's or dioxin or whatever, 
you're overwhelmed by the fact that what we don't know is 
vastly greater than what we do know."
Moore decided to give the notion of assisting victims 
of toxic spills one last try. Forget creating a scheme to 
compensate victims, he thought. Instead, Moore decided to 
create an agency and give it the sole responsibility of 
monitoring health on Superfund sites.
Arriving on Capitol Hill the following morning, Moore 
described his plan for a health agency to his colleagues and 
the Senators on the committee, who agreed to his proposal. 
Hence, on December 11, 1980, when Superfund was signed into 
law, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
was born without so much as consulting the executive branch 
of government, nor the Department of Health and Human 
Services under which it would be housed. In hindsight,
Moore is the first to admit that such a footless beginning 
did not bode well for his new agency, nor the people it was 
supposed to protect.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Three; A Plan Gone Awry
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 
though derived from a well-intentioned plan, is a bastard 
child born of Congressional finagling. Moore's goal was to 
establish a health agency that would help the EPA determine 
which hazardous waste sites were most dangerous, whether 
human exposure was occurring (and, if so, what should be 
done about it) and whether additional health studies were 
needed- What resulted instead was a tiny, underfunded 
organization, without solid leadership, that is unable to 
complete the primary task that was set out for it - 
conducting health assessments.
On the Clark Fork River Superfund project, the agency's 
bumbling can be traced to a decade ago. Early in 1983, EPA 
investigators who were working on the Clark Fork River 
Superfund project submitted soil data collected in Anaconda, 
Mont., to a tiny organization called the Superfund 
Implementation Group that was based at the Centers for 
Disease Control in Atlanta. Personnel who worked for the 
Superfund Implementation Group passed the data to the 
Centers for Disease Control's Center for Environmental 
Health, where scientists reviewed the data and then made 
recommendations back to the Superfund Implementation Group.
14
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Georgi Jones, who ran the Superfund Implementation 
Group, wrote a letter to the EPA describing the scientists' 
concerns. Her letter stated that the Anaconda site held 
toxins that were known to cause health problems. The 
center's scientists had expressed their concern over 
"apparent open public access" to contaminated areas, Jones 
wrote. They questioned whether the surrounding land could 
be suitable "for agriculture, livestock, or even timber 
cutting."
Jones's letter, dispatched from one federal department 
on behalf of scientists who worked for another, is the first 
indication that Curtis Moore's plan had gone awry, at least 
as far as the Clark Fork River site was concerned.
Though Georgi Jones wrote her letter more than two 
years after Superfund's enactment, Moore's Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry didn't yet exist. The 
Department of Health and Human Services had avoided 
establishing the agency by instead creating Jones's ad hoc 
Superfund Implementation Group-
Jones said she was instructed by the assistant 
Secretary of Health in 1981 to coordinate the work of 
several agencies, such as the National Library of Medicine, 
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health and 
others, as it pertained to public health on Superfund sites. 
She set up her office in 1981 in Atlanta within the CDC and
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administered a staff of 14, eight of whom were based in EPA 
regional offices around the United States.
Back then, Stephen Lester, a Harvard-trained 
toxicologist, was working as a consultant for the Love Canal 
Homeowner's Association. He recalled the Superfund 
Implementation Group's early days this way:
"What happened as far as we can tell is that the agency 
was given no money. They were given no specific task. They 
had no leader, in terms of a director. And they had no 
direction other than what was laid out in Superfund, which 
was very vague."
Late in 1982, the Environmental Defense Fund, the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association and the American 
Petroleum Institute, an odd assemblage of bedfellows if 
there ever was one, sued the government for its failure to 
establish the ATSDR. The case was resolved when the 
government agreed to finally create the agency. In April, 
1983, the Public Health Service issued a notice in the 
Federal Register announcing that the ATSDR was created to 
"prevent or mitigate adverse human health effects and 
diminished quality of life resulting from exposure to 
hazardous substances in the environment."
"All of a sudden, we were an agency instead of part of 
CDC," Jones said, noting that the Federal Register item did 
little to change her day to day operations. Jones said she 
believed that other agencies were already carrying out many
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17
of the ATSDR's mandates. In fact, just the opposite was 
true.
According to the Superfund law, the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry was to establish a national 
registry of individuals exposed to toxic substances and a 
registry of "serious diseases and illnesses" caused by 
exposure; to collect and maintain literature concerning the 
health effects of toxic substances; to maintain a list of 
areas closed to the public because of toxic substance 
contamination; to provide medical care and testing to 
exposed individuals, "including, but not limited to tissue 
sampling, chromosomal testing, epidemiological studies...;" 
and to conduct periodic studies to determine the 
relationship between exposure to toxic substances and 
illness.
But in 1983, no agency had established a national 
registry of persons exposed to toxic substances, nor 
developed a list of areas closed to the public, nor 
collected a comprehensive data base on toxic substances. 
Relatively few epidemiological studies had been initiated. 
Nowhere existed any comprehensive effort to monitor and 
protect public health on federal Superfund sites.
One reason for these failings was that the ATSDR was 
without its own director. Typically, a federal agency is 
autonomous. But the ATSDR was established sharing its chief
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administrator with the Centers for Disease Control, a 
situation that remains in place today.
Said Lester, "So as a practical matter, what happened 
is that the people at CDC, who were evaluating health 
problems all around the country at Superfund and non­
superfund sites, by default began doing the work that ATSDR 
was assigned." Lester said that people living on those 
sites were often confused as to who was doing the testing or 
what the testing was for. Often, Lester said, the CDC would 
design studies to test for one health problem when community 
residents were complaining of another.
Indeed, in 1985, it was the CDC, not the ATSDR, that 
conducted urinary arsenic studies on children living in 
Anaconda. The study resulted in the eventual relocation of 
families who lived in Anaconda's Mill Creek community, when 
their children were discovered to have extremely high levels 
of arsenic in their urine. (The moving of these families 
represents the only instance on the entire Clark Fork River 
Superfund project, where thousands of individuals live, when 
health studies resulted in the EPA's decision to move people 
from their homes.) To this day, EPA staffers who work on 
the Clark Fork River project confuse the ATSDR with the CDC.
But it is the ATSDR's token budget which can be even 
more directly attributed to the agency's failings.
Normally, an independent federal agency submits its budget 
directly to the Office of Management and Budget for
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approval. But in this case, the ATSDR submits its budget to 
the EPA for approval, an agency with which it competes for 
Superfund dollars.
In 1983, the ATSDR proposed a $21 million budget. The 
EPA reduced the amount requested to $3.2 million. For the 
next decade, the EPA annually reduced the ATSDR's requested 
budget, often by more than 20 percent. As if playing a cat 
and mouse game. Congress regularly provided the ATSDR with 
more funds than requested by the EPA, but never at the level 
originally requested by the ATSDR.
The ATSDR finally adopted its formal mission in 1985, 
five years after Superfund's enactment. By that time. 
Congress was holding hearings for a Superfund
reauthorization bill, including hearings on the performance 
of the ATSDR. Reauthorization occurred in October 1986, 
under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 
dubbed SARA by its authors, one of whom was Curtis Moore.
The Senate report that accompanied SARA stated that 
while "protection of human health is the highest and 
ultimate goal of the nation's environmental laws,...the 
health-related authorities of [the Superfund law] have not 
been adequately exercised."
Moore still had grave concern for human exposure to 
toxic substances on federal Superfund sites.
Notwithstanding the ATSDR's difficulties in its early years.
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Moore arranged that, via SARA, the agency's responsibilities 
would be substantially increased.
To accomplish these new tasks, SARA provided that the 
ATSDR would receive a minimum annual budget: $50 million in
1987, increasing annually until 1991 when Superfund would be 
reauthorized. To date, however, the ATSDR has never 
received the minimum budget stipulated under SARA.
One of the most important new responsibilities 
delegated to the ATSDR was conducting health assessments on 
all 951 Superfund sites, the sum total that had been listed 
thus far. The law required that the assessments be 
completed by December, 1988, just 24 months after SARA's 
passage.
According to the bill, the public health assessments 
were to involve a study of the contaminants on the site, the 
potential ways people could get exposed to them, and what 
the consequences of exposure would be to the various 
individuals involved. SARA stipulated two purposes for the 
health assessments: (1) to decide whether human exposure to
contaminants on a site should be reduced; and, (2) to decide 
whether additional health studies were necessary on a given 
site.
The sheer volume of work required in just two years was 
tremendous, especially given that in 1986 the ATSDR was a 
tiny agency with fewer than 100 employees. Such a short 
time period did not even allow the agency to develop
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administrative procedures governing health assessments, much 
less to properly conduct the work.
Though ATSDR annual reports claim the agency completed 
the health assessments, in truth, the agency did nothing of
the sort. To satisfy Congress, the agency instead re­
labeled at least 165 documents as health assessments, 
documents that were actually reports already on file 
covering any number of unrelated topics.
In August 1991, the General Accounting Office, the 
investigative arm of Congress, discovered the re-labeled 
documents. Additionally, the GAO found that of the 7 86 
health assessments that actually were completed, many were 
of "uneven quality and of questionable value." Most 
constituted no more than a few pages of text. Few contained 
any health data at all.
The result of the ATSDR^s failings, the GAO said in its
report, was that "communities have not been adequately 
informed about possible health effects" related to Superfund 
sites. Nor has the ATSDR had any substantial influence in 
driving decisions on Superfund sites via the reporting of 
health related matters, the GAO reported.
This failing is amply evident in Butte and Anaconda, 
both of which are included in the group of 165 sites for 
which the ATSDR re-labeled documents as health assessments.
The so-called health assessment for Butte is a memo 
written by an ATSDR staffer regarding whether people who
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swam or waded in Silver Bow Creek would incur health 
problems. The memo doesn't address the widespread 
contamination in Butte nor does it determine whether Butte's
34,000 residents might be exposed to lead,
pentachlorophenol, cadmium or any of the other contaminants 
that lace the streets of the town.
Likewise, the ATSDR document labeled as the health 
assessment for Anaconda is not a health assessment either. 
Instead, it is a letter from an ATSDR physician confirming 
the EPA's 1985 decision to move the Mill Creek families. As 
was the case for Butte, the so-called ATSDR health 
assessment for Anaconda did not address the widespread 
arsenic contamination in the community, nor possible 
exposure to arsenic among Anaconda residents.
The GAO report recommended that the ATSDR develop a 
plan to update previously inadequate health assessments and 
the agency concurred. In October 1991, William Roper, who 
has recently been asked by the Clinton administration to 
step down from his position as director of both the CDC and 
the ATSDR, wrote that ATSDR would revisit the 165 sites as a 
"prudent public health practice."
The 165 sites were prioritized in three categories, 
according to the nature of the health threat on each site.
In ranking the sites, however, no mention was made that the 
ATSDR probably had inadequate information, given its dismal 
performance in the first place. So, while Anaconda and
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Montana Pole (the 4 0-acre plot contaminated with 
pentachlorophenol) received high priority rankings and were 
slotted for re-evaluation by September of 1992, the re- 
evaluation of Butte and Milltown were postponed.
Mike Greenwell, ATSDR public affairs specialist, said 
that Butte received the lower ranking because its original 
health assessment did not classify Butte as a public health 
threat. But the so-called health assessment for Butte was 
not a health assessment at all. Furthermore, in 1986, an 
ATSDR staffer who visited Butte wrote in a memorandum that 
"multiple exposure pathways" existed in Butte and that the 
site represented a "potential health threat to some 
individuals in the area."
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Chapter Four: Risky Business
Sara Weinstock was born and raised in Butte. As a 
child, she played baseball on the now notorious Walkerville 
field, where the EPA discovered mercury seeping from the 
dirt, which itself was 6 percent lead. Now an EPA project 
manager, Weinstock has a standard joke she tells about her 
childhood exposure to lead when she brings visitors on a 
tour of the Butte Superfund site she manages:
"I could have been a surgeon," she says, stifling a 
giggle. "But because of all the lead I got in me growing up 
in Butte, all I ended up being able to do was work for the 
EPA. "
Weinstock is responsible for assigning contracts to 
private firms that gather data in Butte and conduct risk 
analysis on behalf of the EPA. Risk analysis is the process 
the EPA uses to determine the degree of pollution on a site, 
whether cleanup is necessary and if so, what processes are 
to be used.
Ironically, the EPA's risk analysis is entirely 
separate from the ATSDR's health assessment work. Rather 
than gathering actual health data (which theoretically would 
be available form the ATSDR), the EPA involves itself with 
amassing data for establishing that a potential health
24
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threat exists. Under Superfund, if the EPA establishes 
potential health risk, it can force the polluter to pay for 
cleanup. The EPA need not prove that actual health damages 
have occurred and in fact, it goes out of its way to avoid 
doing so.
EPA staffers working on the Clark Fork sites agree that 
gathering data enough to force payment for cleanup (in this 
case, by the Atlantic Richfield Company) is the driving 
force behind their work. If the EPA were required to 
establish that exposure to hazardous chemicals is actually 
occurring on each site, or that physical harm has occurred, 
cleanup would be mired in legal battles, the staffers say. 
For example, how can you define physical harm when a 
carcinogen has a 30-year lag time before taking its toll?
However, establishing potential risk, rather than 
actual harm, hasn't expedited cleanup along on the Clark 
Fork River. A November 1991 GAO report chastised the EPA 
because only two of 23 units within the four Clark Fork 
River sites had actually been cleaned up after the EPA and 
the Atlantic Richfield Company together had spent $54 
million over the past decade. Nearly half of the 
expenditures paid for studies. And in at least three cases, 
no cleanup plans resulted from the studies, the report said.
The EPA's use of risk analysis and the ATSDR's mandate 
to gather health data have never been compatible. Until 
recently, a memorandum of understanding between the two
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agencies dictated that the ATSDR would not become involved 
in risk analysis nor the EPA in the gathering of health 
data.
Some contend that the schism is simply a turf battle. 
For whatever reason, so focussed are EPA personnel on their 
risk program, that they often don't see any need for the 
ATSDR's work. Several Montana EPA staffers admitted that 
they weren't sure what the ATSDR was supposed to do or how 
the agency's work would fit into their program. They say 
that it is the responsibility of the state health 
department, not the EPA, to request the ATSDR's involvement 
on a Superfund site.
Such a belief is contrary to the law. While the state 
and local health departments may request the ATSDR's 
involvement in a site, in the form of a health consultation, 
the ATSDR by definition is to be involved in all Superfund 
from the time each is proposed to the National Priorities 
List.
In the absence of the ATSDR's involvement, how adequate 
is the risk analysis?
Risk analysis is a high-tech guessing game that 
generates a number designating the relative risk to a 
specific illness (like cancer) that an individual incurs 
after coming into contact with a toxin. The number results 
from a computer analysis of data gathered from each site's 
soil, air and water as well as estimates concerning who
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might come into contact with the contaminated medium, the 
frequency of that contact, and the like.
When the EPA's standards for risk are exceeded (for 
example, if the analysis points toward greater than one in
10,000 risk of an individual getting cancer), then a site 
must be cleaned up.
Stephen Lester, now science director for the Citizen's 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Inc., (which he co­
founded with Love Canal homeowner, Lois Gibbs), points out 
that in some cases the industry that is ultimately 
responsible for paying for cleanup on Superfund sites has 
influenced the risk model or the analysis results.
Such was the case when an Atlantic Richfield Company- 
financed blood lead study among Butte's children ultimately 
resulted in the EPA adjusting its cleanup standard for lead- 
contaminated soils in Butte. The University of Cincinnati, 
which conducted the study, found that Butte children had 
blood lead levels lower than the national average.
While the EPA had originally proposed cleaning up soils 
with greater than 1,000 parts per million lead, it will now 
most likely clean up only those soils with greater than 
1,500 parts per million lead. The practical result of the 
study is that the Atlantic Richfield Company will have saved 
itself considerable amounts of money because fewer areas in 
Butte will be cleaned up. This is the case even though 
prominent lead scientists have called for more stringent
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lead cleanup, one saying that no more than 100 parts per 
million lead should be allowed in residential soils.
In its 1991 report. Environmental Epidemiology^ Public 
Health and Hazardous Wastes, the National Academy of 
Sciences's Committee on Environmental Epidemiology called 
risk analysis "highly speculative and almost always relying 
on multiple assumptions of fact - some of which are entirely 
untestable." And Stephen Lester calls risk analysis "more 
art than science."
"The people at the EPA who do risk analysis believe it 
is science and believe the numbers that come out of it are 
real, which I think is the most dangerous part of the whole 
process," he said.
Sara Weinstock may joke about her childhood exposure to 
lead but scientists agree that any amount of lead, no matter 
how minuscule, has no place in the human body. Particularly 
dangerous in children, lead has been shown to diminish IQ, 
reduce a child's growth, and behave as a neurotoxin.
Absorption of arsenic also causes ill-health effects.
At low levels, arsenic can cause stomach irritation; it can 
also cause heart abnormalities. Long term exposure to 
arsenic brings about skin changes and eventually, skin 
cancer. Cadmium, a carcinogen, also is linked to health 
problems, like kidney and heart disease, lung damage, and 
even death. With exposure to mercury, there's a similar 
story: fetal malformations, brain and kidney damage.
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Finding the effects of environmental toxins is hardly 
ever easy. Linking cause and effect broadly across a 
community requires extensive study of vital statistics and 
health records. It requires going out and interviewing 
individuals. It requires asking the right questions, 
questions that are supposed to be asked when health 
assessments are completed.
Nevertheless, one doesn't have to look far to discover 
that both Silver Bow and Deer Lodge counties, home to Butte 
and Anaconda respectively, rank high for incidence of death 
and reportable disease within Montana and nationwide-
For example. Deer Lodge County ranked first and Silver 
Bow County was in the top five among Montana's most populous 
counties in death rate from heart disease in both 1990 and
1991. For the same years, they were among the top 10 for 
cancer mortality.
Considering incidence of cancer (as opposed to deaths 
due to cancer), in the years 1983-90, Deer Lodge County 
ranked first for breast cancer among Montana's most populous 
counties. Deer Lodge and Silver Bow were among the top 10 
for all other reportable cancers (colo/rectal, pancreatic, 
lung, prostate and bladder) during those years.
Nationally, the rate of cancer among women in Butte 
ranked within the top 5 percent of U.S. counties between 
1970-79. And in the years between 1949 and 1971, Butte's 
rate of death from diseases was highest or among the highest
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of any of 480 ranked U.S. cities. Statisticians working in 
Montana's Department of Health and Environmental Sciences 
privately admit that Butte and Anaconda have consistently 
ranked high for other poor health outcomes, like 
miscarriages and fetal deaths.
Perhaps much more insidious are the potential effects 
of exposure to lead, including reduced IQ, about which Sara 
Weinstock jokes. While no comprehensive measurement of IQ 
exists for Montana's children, the state does compile an 
annual listing, by school district, for incidence of 
learning disability and cognitive disorder, both 
classifications under the special education system.
The 1991 Montana Special Education Child Count, an 
annual report compiled by the state Department of Public 
Instruction, reveals that for high schools with greater than 
400 children enrolled (of which there are 21), Anaconda and 
Butte rank first and second respectively for rates of 
learning disorder and cognitive disorder. In both high 
schools, the rate is nearly twice the rate averaged among 
the state's 21 largest schools.
Yet the EPA personnel who work on the Clark Fork River 
sites do not see a threat to human health. "There aren't 
any obvious public health risks posed by the river and the 
environs itself," said John Wardell, director of the Montana 
EPA office. Several of the EPA and Montana Department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences project managers -
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individuals who manage specific portions of the four sites - 
were in agreement.
"Basically, from the data we've seen, we haven't seen 
anything from a public health perspective that would cause 
us to feel that there's a great public health endangerment," 
said Neil Marsh, who is responsible for cleanup of the mine 
tailings along the river.
The EPA, however, is not an agency that boasts a 
proficiency in public health matters among its ranks. In 
1990, the American Journal of Public Health reported that of 
the 750 individuals employed in the EPA's Office of Solid 
Waste and Emergency Response, which administers the 
Superfund Program, there were no medical officers, no public 
health program specialists, nor a single public health 
educator.
Of the eight EPA employees who are principally 
responsible for cleaning up Montana's mining wastes, five 
are engineers, one has a degree in public administration and 
one has training as a soils hydrologist. Only one has a 
degree related to health - and that is in occupational 
safety.
"Exposure isn't our ball game," said project manager, 
Russ Forba, who is responsible for cleaning up Butte's lead­
laden soils. "We don't go out and look to see if there is 
an impact on people."
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Forba is right. It's the ATSDR, not the EPA, that is 
supposed to determine if there is an impact on people who 
live on Superfund sites. Yet in this instance, the public 
health assessments were never done.
The point here is that without adequate health 
assessments, the follow-up health studies (in-depth analyses 
of health data within a Superfund community that are 
provided for under SARA) will never be undertaken by the 
ATSDR in Butte and Anaconda. That's because the so-called 
health assessments - the re-labeled documents - give no 
indication that health studies are warranted.
The Committee on Environmental Epidemiology concluded 
that health assessments, not risk analysis, are essential in 
determining whether individuals who come into contact with 
hazardous wastes sites are in danger of becoming ill. The 
ATSDR needs at least $165 million annually to properly 
conduct health assessments, the committee said. Yet in 
1989, the agency spent $15.9 million on health assessments.
The committee criticized the EPA's reliance on risk 
analysis and government's failure to adequately fund the 
ATSDR to gather actual epidemiological data. "A decade 
after the implementation of Superfund... substantial public 
health concerns remain and critical information on the 
distribution of exposures and health affects associated with 
hazardous wastes sites is still lacking," the committee 
reported. "The characterization of sites more often
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reflects requirements of environmental engineering and site 
remediation than assessment of public health concerns."
So great is the emphasis on engineering over public 
health, the committee said, that of the $4.2 billion 
annually spent on hazardous waste cleanup, less than 1 
percent has gone toward the evaluation of human health.
In the end, risk analysis may be all that is needed to 
force polluters to pay for cleanup on Superfund sites. But 
risk analysis alone will never help a victim whose health 
has been damaged obtain an award in a court of law. As it 
is, trial lawyers shy away from health damage claims on 
toxic waste sites because so little information exists to 
help a victim prove his case. Without actual health data, 
Moore''s "poor sucker who got hit by the train" is no better 
off now than he was when the Superfund law was passed.
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Chapter Five: Talk and No Action
Georgi Jones, who started out directing the Superfund 
Implementation Group, now heads the ATSDR's Office of Policy 
and External Affairs. Since her letter of 1983, which 
described the health threats in Anaconda, there have been 
occasional calls for comprehensive evaluation of health and 
epidemiological data in Butte and Anaconda, calls made on 
the part of both the ATSDR and the EPA, as well as the 
Atlantic Richfield Company.
For example, in 1985, a preliminary work plan for 
evaluating Anaconda included a proposed epidemiological 
study evaluating the number of lung and skin cancer cases in 
the community. On review, the Center for Environmental 
Health (via Georgi Jones in the Superfund Implementation 
Group) pointed out "a number of weaknesses in the proposed 
study" that needed to be addressed before the study be 
undertaken. The study was never completed.
In 1986, Kim Mortensen, an ATSDR health scientist, 
visited the Clark Fork River sites and reported that "there 
are a large number of people exposed, or potentially 
exposed, to high levels of heavy metals." He pointed out 
that "there has been no official health assessment or 
scoping of health concerns by ATSDR on the entire site."
34
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Finally, he stated that the EPA is anxious to have the ATSDR 
involved in the cleanup process.
That same year, Mortensen wrote in another report that 
"it is clear that people are living in close proximity to 
the sources of exposure and that potentially toxic levels of 
heavy metals are spread throughout much of the site. There 
are multiple exposure pathways by which some individuals may 
receive significant exposures to heavy metals."
Mortensen called on ATSDR and EPA scientists to discuss 
sampling needs, possible exposure, and epidemiological 
studies. In other words, he suggested that the two agencies 
assess health risks on the Clark Fork River sites.
In 1988, Russ Forba, EPA project manager, wrote the 
ATSDR and requested that the agency consider a biological 
testing program "to help assess the impact of lead, arsenic, 
and other heavy metals on the residents,"
But neither the kind of involvement called for by 
Mortensen, nor the testing requested by Forba ever were 
undertaken by the ATSDR and the EPA. "The ATSDR doesn't 
have the manpower to take a detailed look at a site of this 
size," Forba later said. "We [now] know how overwhelmed the 
ATSDR is and we look forward to getting whatever information 
we can from them, but we don't expect a great wealth of new 
knowledge from them."
Even Roper's promise for a revisit of the 165 sites 
(made in his response to the 1991 GAO report) didn't mean
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that the long overdue health assessments for those sites 
would actually be forthcoming. Instead, the ATSDR planned a 
lesser study for each site, a "site review and update", from 
which a health assessment would follow only if the ATSDR 
reviewer deemed it necessary.
Anaconda and the Montana Pole site in Butte received 
their site review and updates during the summer of 1992.
Tina Forrester, an ATSDR environmental health scientist, 
conducted the reviews and reported her findings in the fall 
of 1992. Nearly ten years after scientists at the Center 
for Environmental Health expressed their concern over 
agricultural use of and open public access to the Anaconda 
site, ten years after Georgi Jones reported that concern in 
a letter to the EPA, Forrester found ample evidence of 
trespassing across contaminated soils (ATV tracks, human 
foot prints, and the like).
"I can't believe people really have access to those 
areas," Forrester said, adding that she also found evidence 
of trespass on the Montana Pole site.
"I guess that the most surprising thing was that 
farmers were grazing cattle in Mill Creek (the area where 
families had been evacuated)," she said.
Regarding Montana Pole, Forrester wrote,
"vagrants... and children wading or swimming in the creek may 
have contact with site contaminants." Yet she did not 
recommend a full-blown health assessment. Instead, she
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called for two health consultations, one to address 
citizens' concerns about exposure to the pentachlorophenol 
and one to address air quality. (A health consultation is a 
response by the ATSDR to a specific question about a site.)
For Anaconda, Forrester came to a different conclusion. 
Pointing toward the potential for current and future 
exposure to arsenic among Anaconda residents, Forrester 
recommended that an "urgent" public health assessment be 
undertaken-
To date, the "urgent" health assessment in Anaconda 
hasn't been started. And in March of 1993, Charlie Coleman, 
the EPA project manager for Anaconda, could not recall what 
Forrester's report said or explain why it may affect his 
cleanup plans. Meanwhile, the ATSDR offers no estimate as 
to when the health assessment may begin.
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Chapter Six: Unfinished Business
Todd Damrow, state epidemiologist in Montana's 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences is only 
vaguely aware of the health statistics that characterize the 
Clark Fork River superfund sites. His focus, he said, is 
communicable disease, not toxic waste.
"We just don't have the resources in our division to 
support Superfund people," he said. The health problems 
that are evident in Silver Bow and Deer Lodge Counties could 
be caused by any number of reasons, he said, not just the 
mining wastes.
Likewise, Dan Dennehy, director of Butte-Silver Bow 
County Health Department, is unable to respond to health 
threats posed by the Superfund site which comprises the 
breadth of his community. His staff is small, he said, and 
its focus is on sanitation, air pollution, immunizations and 
the like.
And while his department is cooperating with an 
Atlantic Richfield Company-financed program to test blood- 
lead among Butte's children, Dennehy has neither the time, 
nor the energy to tackle the ATSDR's failings. He admitted 
that he isn't even exactly sure what the agency is supposed 
to do in his community.
38
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The problems faced by these two health officials are no 
different than those faced by others in similar positions 
across the United States. After all, per capita production 
of hazardous waste in the United States is nearly 50,000 
pounds annually, a total of about 5.5 billion metric tons. 
And the Office of Technology Assessment estimates that 
hazardous waste sites number upwards of 4 39,000 nationwide, 
even though only a fraction of those are managed under the 
Superfund program.
Despite Curtis Moore's decade of work, actual health 
data was and continues to be ignored in the process of 
carrying out the Superfund law. The National Research 
Council's committee on Environmental Epidemiology concluded 
that in creating the ATSDR, Congress, though perhaps 
unwittingly, relieved the EPA of its responsibility toward 
public health on Superfund sites. In screening sites before 
adding them to Superfund's National Priorities list, "no 
attempt is made to characterize the potential public health 
impact" of the sites, the committee reported.
Yet the potential for human exposure to contaminants on 
hazardous waste sites is tremendous. For National 
Priorities List sites alone, the ATSDR estimates that more 
than 40 million people live within four miles of a Superfund 
site and more than 4 million live as close as one mile from 
one. Nearly 2 million of these people represent those most
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susceptible to illness or injury: women of childbearing
age, children and the elderly.
While EPA personnel gather extensive data required for 
engineering and court battles, at an average cost of $25 to 
30 million per site, the gathering of human health data is 
kept to a minimum, if it is done at all. The Committee on 
Environmental Epidemiology concluded that there are only 
sparse data on the full extent of hazardous waste 
contamination and even less data on how these toxins have 
affected human health. The Committee further concluded that 
the question asking whether human health is being protected 
on federal Superfund sites could not be answered.
The Clark Fork River sites are just four among some 
1,200 that are managed under the Superfund program. But 
what is going on there, or more appropriately, what isn^t 
going on in the way of health assessments, is representative 
of the way Superfund sites are managed across the United 
States.
Stephen Lester believes that the slipshod manner in 
which the ATSDR conducts itself will have long lasting 
effects :
"The bureaucrats still look to what was done at all, no 
matter how incompetent, as the basis for taking action," 
Lester said. "The fact is that on the record, the decision 
makers who could act don't have what they need to act. The
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official health assessment still says there's no problem 
here."
What's as important, Lester said, is that "the people 
who live in those communities don't have any information as 
to what the health risks are."
Yet what has held the ATSDR back from doing its job for 
a decade may continue indefinitely. While the EPA is likely 
to reach cabinet status under the Clinton administration, 
the ATSDR's status is not likely to be bolstered in the 
process. In fact, Capitol Hill insiders say that the EPA's 
proposed budget, scheduled for public hearing in May, 
includes not a raise, but a 2 6 percent reduction for the 
ATSDR.
Like the thousands who are potentially exposed to 
hazardous waste elsewhere, the citizens of Butte and 
Anaconda remain living on a contaminated land, unaware of 
any damage to their health that may be occurring. Perhaps 
their prayers to Our Lady of the Rockies will be sufficient 
to protect them. One way or the other, they'll likely never 
know the difference.
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------/ "Site Review and Update: Montana Pole and Treating,
Butte, Silver Bow County, Montana." Prepared by Tina M. 
Forrester. 4 September 1992. CERCLIS NO. M T D 0 0 6 2 3 0 6 3 5
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----- f Toxicological Profile for Arsenic.(draft) Prepared by
Life Systems, Inc. under subcontract for Clement 
International Corporation. October 1991.
----- , Toxicological Profile for Cadmium, (draft) Prepared
by Life Systems, Inc. under subcontract for Clement 
International Corporation. October 1991.
----- r Toxicological Profile for Lead, (draft) Prepared by
Clement International Corporation. October 1991.
----- , Toxicological Profile for Mercury. Prepared by
Clement Associates. December 1989.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health 
Service, Centers for Disease Control. Preventing Lead 
Poisoning in Young Children. October 1991.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Human Health 
Evaluation Manual Part A Interim Final," Risk 
Assessment Guidance for Superfund, (pre-publication 
copy) July 1989.
----- , "National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan; Final Rule." Federal Register (8 
March 1990) vol. 55. no. 46, p. 8813-8864.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Montana Department 
of Health & Environmental Sciences, Clark Fork 
Superfund Master Plan. October 1988.
----- , Clark Fork Superfund Sites Master Plan. November
1990.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Department of 
Health & Environmental Sciences, et al. (collectively 
known as the Master Plan Work Group), Clark Fork 
Superfund Sites Master Plan Update (draft). January
1992.
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region VIII Montana
Office, "Risk and Action Levels," Anaconda Smelter Site 
Update, undated.
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Interviews
Antonioli, Brian, Superfund project officer, Montana
Superfund Program, interviewed by author, 21 April
1992, at Helena, Mont.
Bishop, Mike, remedial project manager, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, interviewed by author, 8 April 1982 
at Helena, Mont., by telephone, 13 April, 1992, and 22 
April 1992, at Helena.
Chapman, Mike, Division of Special Education, Montana Office 
of Public Instruction, 5 August 1992 through 30 March
1993, interviewed by author on several occasions, by 
telephone.
Coleman, Charles, remedial project manager, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, interviewed by author, 
8 April 1992, at Helena, and 16 March 1993 at Missoula.
------ , confidential source, interviewed by author, 4 June
1992, at Washington, D.C., and 22 April 1993, by 
telephone.
DalSoglio, Julie, remedial project manager, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, interviewed by author,
7 April 1992, at Helena.
Damrow, Todd, state epidemiologist, Montana Department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences, interviewed by 
author, 22 April 1992, at Helena.
Dennehy, Dan, health director, Butte-Silver Bow County,
interviewed by author, 11 June 1992 at Butte, Mont., 
and 4 August 1992, by telephone.
Forba, Russell W. remedial project manager, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, interviewed by author,
8 April 1992, at Helena, and 7 August 1992 by 
telephone.
Forrester, Tina, toxicologist. Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry, interviewed by author, 28 July 
19 92, by telephone.
Fox, Robert, Clark Fork Superfund coordinator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, interviewed by author, 
8 April 1992, at Helena.
Greenwell, Michael, public affairs specialist. Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, interviewed by
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author, 1 June 1992, at Atlanta, Ga., and 16 July 1992 
by telephone.
Hadley, Wayne, former Love Canal resident, currently 
fisheries biologist, Montana Department of Fish. 
Wildlife and Parks, interviewed by author, 3 April 
1992, at Deer Lodge, Mont.
Hillery, Pam, community involvement coordinator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, interviewed by author, 
18 October 1991, at Missoula, 25 October 1991, by 
telephone and 7 April 1992, at Helena.
Hutchinson, Leslie, physician. Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry, interviewed by author, 1 June 
1992, at Atlanta.
Jones, Georgi, director. Office Of Policy and External 
Affairs, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry, interviewed by author, 2 June 1992, at 
Atlanta.
Lester, Stephen, science director and toxicologist.
Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Inc., 
interviewed by author, 4 June 1992, at Arlington, Va., 
and 15 March 1993 by telephone.
Luoma, Samuel N., biologist, U. S. Geological Survey, 
interviewed by author, 2 3 July 1992, at Missoula.
Marsh, Neil, Superfund project officer, Montana Superfund 
Program, interviewed by author, 21 April 1992, at 
Helena.
McGeehin, Michael A., epidemiologist and former Region VII
representative. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry, interviewed by author, 1 June 1992, at 
Atlanta,
Mclnery, Mike, Montana Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences Vital Records Division, 
interviewed by author, 22 April 1992, at Helena.
Moore, Curtis, former staffer, U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Environment and Public Works, interviewed by author, 4 
June 1992, at Washington, D.C.
Ray, John, Butte resident and Montana Environmental
Information Center president, interviewed by author, 11 
June 1992, at Butte.
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Reyes, Juan J., acting deputy director. Division of Health 
Assessment and Consultation, Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, interviewed by author, 
1 June 1992, at Atlanta.
Silbergeld, Ellen, toxicologist, interviewed by author, 20 
April 1992, by telephone.
Sperry, Sam, chief, Montana Records and Statistics Bureau, 
interviewed by author on several occasions, 5 August 
1992 through 30 March 1993, by telephone.
Sullivan, Mary Lou, former Butte and Anaconda resident, 2 3 
July 1992, by telephone.
Stiles, Jane, public information officer, Montana Superfund 
Program, interviewed by author, 14 April 1992, by 
telephone and, 21 April 1992, at Helena.
Weinstock, Sara, remedial project manager, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, interviewed by author, 
21 April 1992, at Helena. (Ms. Weinstock also served as 
my guide on a tour of the Butte area Superfund site on 
23 April 1992.)
Wardell, John, state director, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, interviewed by author, 7 April 1992, at Helena.
Miscellaneous
Chapman, Michael, Division of Special Education. Montana's 
Special Education Child Count : Six Years of Growth. 
WESTAT, Inc. 13 March 1992.
Gibbs, Lois Marie, Centers for Disease Control: Cover-up.
Deceit and Confusion; How Science and Epidemiology Gets 
r sic 1 Side-tracked by Politics. Citizen's 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Inc. 1988
-, to Barry Johnson, assistant administrator of Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, "Memorandum 
commenting on ATSDR's record of performance." 10 
January 1990.
-, "Report on a Meeting between ATSDR and Community 
Representatives June 30, 1990, Washington, D.C." 
undated. Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Inc.
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
Administrative Record for Clark Fork Superfund Sites
(Note; I conducted an extensive review of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection A g e n c y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  record 
(located in Helena) for the Clark Fork River Superfund 
sites. Record center personnel used a computer-assisted, 
key word search to locate documents describing public 
health, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
and the Centers for Disease Control. From this search, 
record center personnel generated a list. I made a Freedom 
of Information Act Reguest to obtain documents mentioned on 
the list that appeared to be germane to my research. While 
I obtained more than 50 documents, those listed below are 
documents specifically related to the manuscript and which 
are not listed above. The list is chronological.)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, "Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry and the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency." 2 April 1985. File 
5011300, Doc. 100004.
Jones, Georgi A. to Edward J. Skowronski, "Memorandum
describing comments on submitted data on the Anaconda 
Smelter Waste site... reviewed by a committee of the 
Center for Environmental Health." 1 March 1983. File 
2021707, Doc. lOOOOOlG.
Jones, Georgi A. to Edward J. Skowronski, "Memorandum 
describing comments on the proposed work plan by 
Environmental Health Associates entitled ""An 
Epidemiologic Evaluation of Lung and Skin Cancer 
Incidence in Communities Near the Anaconda Smelter.'"
26 February 1985. File 2021707, Doc. 10000IF.
Binder, Sue, David Forney and Dan Paschal, "Anaconda Montana 
July 1985 Arsenic Study." undated. File 2021707, Doc., 
100003.
Binder, Sue to George Buynowski, "Memorandum discouraging a 
health study in Anaconda, which was requested by area 
residents." 10 March 1986. File 2021712, Doc. 300018.
Lybarger, Jeffrey A. to Michael A. McGeehin, "Memorandum
describing preliminary assessment of fish and waterfowl 
sampling data for Silver Bow Creek." 24 April 1986.
File 5012302, Doc. 100058.
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Mortensen, B. Kim, "Trip Report following review of Silver 
Bow Creek NPL sites." 23 May 1986. File 5011507 Doc. 
200001.
Mortensen, B. Kim and Gaiyla Walters, "Health Assessment of 
Butte Mining District." some time before 21 October 
1986 (as is evidenced in text). File 4012007, Doc. 
402162.
Lybarger, Jeffrey A . , "Memorandum describing Health
Assessment Data Needs." July 1986. File 7777777, Doc. 
100025.
Lybarger, Jeffrey A. to Michael A. McGeehin, "Memorandum 
describing Health Assessment of Mill Creek, Montana, 
conducted at EPA's request." 5 September 1986. File 
2021804, Doc. 300001.
Forba, Russell W. to Michael McGeehin, "Letter describing 
Forba's request for ATSDR to conduct a biological 
sampling program in Butte." 30 June 1988. File 4012 007, 
Doc. 100001.
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